Tuesday, August 20, 2002

Jesse Lauriston Livermore - greatest trader of all time (?)

Jesse Lauriston Livermore (July 26, 1877 — November 28, 1940), also known as "Great Bear of Wall Street", was an early 20th century stock investor. He was famed for making several multi-million dollar fortunes and short selling during the stock market crashes in1907 and 1929.

One of the most popular books Reminiscences of a Stock Operator,reflects on many of those lessons. Livermore himself wrote a less widely read book, "How to trade in stocks; the Livermore formula for combining time element and price". It was published in 1940.

Livermore first became famous after the Panic of 1907 when he sold the market short as it crashed. He noticed conditions where a lack of capital existed to buy stock. Accordingly, he predicted that there would be a sharp drop in prices when many speculators were simultaneously forced to sell by margin calls and a lack of credit. With the lack of capital, there would be no buyers in sight to absorb the sold stock, further driving down prices. After the crash and its aftermath, he was worth $3 million.

Livermore continued to make money in the bull markets of the 1920s. In 1929, he noticed market conditions similar to that of the 1907 market. He began shorting various stocks and adding to his positions, and they kept declining in price. When just about everyone in the markets lost money in the Wall Street crash of 1929, Livermore was worth $100 million after his short-selling profits.

What is not well know that he subsequently lost both fortunes. Apart from his success as a securities speculator, Livermore left traders a working philosophy for trading securities that emphasizes increasing the size of one'sposition as it goes in the right direction and cutting losses quickly.Livermore sometimes did not follow his own rules strictly. He claimed that his lack of adherence to his own rules was the main reason for his losses after making his 1907 and 1929 fortunes.

On November 28, 1940, Livermore shot and killed himself in the cloakroom of the Sherry Netherland Hotel in Manhattan. The police revealed that there was a suicide note of eight small handwritten pages in Livermore's personal notebook. ....."Things have been bad with me. I am tired of fighting. Can’t carry on any longer. This is the only way out. "

Monday, August 19, 2002

Wonderland of Investment - Warren Buffett

I am a great fan of Warren Buffett. I think it is not without reason that people call him sage of Omaha. I think he should be considered as a modern day hero.

Listen to what he said in CNBC:

This is part four of the transcript and video clips of Warren Buffett's appearances on CNBC's Squawk Box on Monday, March 9, 2009- Part 4

( http://www.cnbc.com/id/29595993/)

The interview is talking about an artice he wrote in The New York Times: A simple rule dictates my buying: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful. Let me be clear on one point: I can't predict the short-term movements of the stock market. I haven't the faintest idea as to whether stocks will be higher or lower a month--or a year--from now. What is likely, however, is that the market will move higher, perhaps substantially so, well before either sentiment or the economy turns up. So if you wait for the robins, spring will be over. -- Warren Buffett Op-Ed Oct. 17, 2008

BUFFETT:. And within the body of that article I said things are--I started off saying things are a mess and they're going to get worse in the economy and all of that. But I did say--and I said I can't predict the stock market. I don't know the bottom. I mean, if I knew the bottom, you know, I wouldn't have to look up 10-Ks and do all that stuff, I'd just buy the S&P 500 at the bottoms .
So I have no idea what the stock market's going to do tomorrow or next week or next month or next year. And I actually said it twice in the article, and the editor said, `You're not supposed to say things twice.' I said, `I want to say this twice.' But what I did say, and I'd say it absolutely today, is that you will--over a 10-year period you will do considerably better owning a group of equities and don't--not just one stock, but a group of equities than you will either owning short-term Treasuries and rolling them, in which case you get virtually nothing, or owning a 10-year Treasury that gets a few percent.
BUFFETT: I mean, equities will do better than that. I don't know whether they'll do better than that over a year. And I didn't know then, and that's been proven. But that's not my game. And, overall, equities are going to do far better than US government bonds at these prices. The US government bond is guaranteed to lose purchasing power. I mean, it--there's no way we follow the policies we're following without money becoming worth less over time. That's been true of governments every place, you know, forever. So I stand by the article; I just wish I'd run it a few months later.
BECKY: Well, they're--a very smart person asked me, they said you knew that the economy was going to get worse.
BECKY: So why did you make the major investments you made in a General Electric, in a Goldman Sachs at the time that you did instead of waiting? Why buy then?
BUFFETT: Well, both--in those cases, I got 10 percent preferred that I don't think I could get now. So, I mean, actually--I don't think Goldman would issue me a 10 percent preferred now. Although they--if they did and there were warrants attached, the warrants would be cheaper. But that was a time when both of those companies wanted money immediately and we could structure a preferred that was attractive. But the fact that business is going to get worse does not mean you should wait to buy stocks. I mean, if...
JOE: But, Warren, I...
BUFFETT: It doesn't--it doesn't--go ahead, Joe. I'm sorry.
JOE: I was thinking about, you know, you did and that was the attractiveness, I guess, the 10 percent yield. But I think a lot of your long-term--your long-term holdings--for example, American Express you can now pick up almost for single digits.
JOE: Wells Fargo, one of your favorites, is single digits, 8.60. Goldman Sachs, you liked it, you said it's going to be around; GE, you like it, you say it's going to be--I can't remember, maybe 100 years or it's going to be a great company. That's at $7. It would seem to me that maybe by the end of this quarter we're going to hear that you were buying a lot of these things.
BUFFETT: Well, I'm glad you know, Joe, because...
JOE: But if you liked them--if you like these things and you've held American Express for $50 or whatever for a long time, that would give us a lot of confidence if you saw it at 10 and decided I'm going to--I'm going to buy a lot more here and just lower my average price.
BUFFETT: Yeah. American Express is a special case, Joe, because it's a--it has become a bank holding company. And if you own over--we own over 10 percent of American Express. If you own over 10 percent of it--if you own over 9.9 something percent of a bank holding company, you need the permission, I believe, of the Federal Reserve to buy another share. So they--they're becoming a bank holding company I believe. As I understand the law, it precludes us buying another share of that because we are at that percentage already.
JOE: But...
BUFFETT: But I would--American Express, for example, you know, it's very clear that American Express' losses in 2009 on their receivables will be, you know, considerably higher than last year. And their earnings will suffer to some degree accordingly. But that doesn't mean that American Express isn't a hell of a buy at $10. American Express is going to be around forever. They've got the cream of cardholders. Unfortunately, they have some cardholders that aren't the cream, too.
JOE: But you're not--you're not a 10 percent in GE, I don't think, yet.
BUFFETT: No. No, I--and--no. And we--but we bought the preferred of GE. You know, we--there are things I like to buy, but I also want to be absolutely sure--I mean, my job is to be sure that Berkshire does not need the help of anybody in getting through the toughest of times. So we keep a lot of cash. But I don't like to keep more cash than's necessary, but I regard necessary as always way more than other people regard as necessary because I always think in terms of worst cases.
BECKY: In the past, you've said $10 billion you like to keep around. Is that still there?
BUFFETT: Well, $10 billion is an absolute minimum. So if I'm going--I'm going to say $10 billion is a minimum, I always have to have quite a bit more than that to be sure that I don't go below that. Because we could have a hurricane tomorrow or something of the sort in our insurance business or, you know, who knows? So I leave--I leave a cushion above that.
BECKY: Is the cushion bigger than it used to be, or is...
BECKY: ...this the same as always?
BUFFETT: The cushion--what is--what has changed is that we will do less cat insure--catastrophe insurance business this year than we would have done in a year when we had way--even way more cash. I look in--you know, I look, I say to myself if there's a 9.0 earthquake in Los Angeles or San Francisco or the Pacific Northwest or something, I want to be prepared to have a lot of money afterwards. And, you know, it--I have to err on the side of caution. But that doesn't mean I go into a cave either. And when we got the chance to buy, we did the Wrigley deal, we did GE, we did--we did--we did Goldman, a lot of money went out then. In fact, when we did the GE deal I actually simultaneously made a deal with a base price on selling a couple billion dollars' worth of J&J. I didn't want to sell J&J. I mean, I like J&J.
But I just, you know, I didn't--I didn't want to--I didn't want to commit that much money without having a couple billion coming in at the same time. And that's my job, though, is to be--I don't want--we can't depend on anybody.
BECKY: There's a question that came in from Kevin in Tifton, Georgia. He says, "I keep hearing people like Doug Kass say that your style of buy and hold investing is dead. Do you think that's true?"
BUFFETT: Well, it depends what you buy and hold. It's--if you buy the right businesses at the right price--you know, we own 70 businesses. We own See's Candy.
BECKY: Right.
BUFFETT: So we have bought and hold See's Candy since 1972. It's a very good business. Now, does that mean that if it's stock was quoted every day I couldn't have danced in and out with 100 shares or 500 shares? But if you're in the right business--Coca-Cola, 1886 or something like that, you know. Per capita's probably gone up of their products virtually every year. So, if we own a good business--if some another guy can buy one stock today, sell another--sell it tomorrow, buy another stock--if you--he may be able to make more money doing that than I can do with buy and hold. All I know is if I buy the right businesses, I'll do very well.
BECKY: OK, let's get to some more questions right now. Joe's right, we have had thousands that have been coming in, Warren, so we'd like to get you back to one from Adam in Springfield, Virginia. He writes and he wants to know, "If you could take back one investment you've made in the last year, what would it be and why?"
BUFFETT: Well, there'd be quite a few in terms--well, I mentioned in the annual report that, you know, I bought ConocoPhillips when oil was selling well above 100, and I was wrong about oil and therefore that made me wrong about that stock big time. I bought a couple of--smaller, but I bought a couple stocks in the--stocks in a couple banks in Ireland. I did not do my homework sufficiently on that, and I was just dead wrong. So I make plenty of mistakes. The interesting thing is--and I'll make plenty more mistakes, too. That's part of the game. You just got to make sure that the right things overcome the wrong ones.
BECKY: We're trying to focus this hour on your investment strategy. And Doug Kass of Seabreeze Partners has written in in the past, he's been critical of your investment style recently, and he had a question for you as well. He says, "Mr. Buffett, your long-held investment philosophy has been importantly based on one, successfully identifying companies whose business franchises were protected by moats, and two, holding--a holding period of forever. So do you think the moats of your financial holdings have been flooded, and in light of a business world that's now changing more rapidly than the past, do you plan to alter your holding period of forever to a lesser period of time?"
BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I--in terms of our businesses, the ones we buy, like See's Candy or those, we really do plan to hold them forever. I mean, our stocks we plan to hold a very long time. Washington Post stock we've held since 1973, I believe, and Coke's been long time. But overall I like to buy them with the idea of owning forever. And the quotes don't make much difference. I own three things outside stocks. I own--I own--I own a quarter of the baseball team here in town. I don't get a quote on it every day. I've had it 15 years. I own a farm near here, bought it 20 years--I don't get a quote on it every day. I look to the performance of the asset.
Now, if I looked at the performance of Wells Fargo, we'll say, I see that, you know, in a couple years--and management doesn't have anything to do with what I'm saying here. I--these are not from them. But I would expect $40 billion a year pre-provision income. And under normal conditions I would expect maybe 10 to $12 billion a year of losses. I mean, you lose money in banking, you just try not to lose too much. So, you know, you get to very interesting figures. I mean, the spreads are enormous on what they're doing. They're getting the money at bargain rates. So I--if there were no quote on Wells Fargo and I just owned it like I own my farm, I would look at the way the business is developing, and I would say, you know, it's--`These are a couple of tough years for losses in the banking business, but you expect a couple tough years every now and then.' And that the earning power is never--is going to be greater by far than it's ever been when you get all through with it. The only worry in that is the government will force you to sell shares at some terribly low price. And I hope they're wise enough not to do that. That would--that's what--that's what's spooking the banking market to a big extent.
BECKY: You worry about that, too.
BUFFETT: Yeah, sure.
BECKY: That's why you'd like some clarity out of Washington on what they're planning to do...
BUFFETT: I--that's one of the reasons. I particular--I think clarity is a good thing for the whole country on a--on a lot of--any issue to do with people's money, clarity's important. People want to be clear about their money. But I would say that if--if we own US Bancorp, which we do, or Wells Fargo, their prospects three years out have been better than ever.
BECKY: Mm-hmm.
BUFFETT: And if they weren't quoted, you know, people would feel fine owning the business and I think they would say that, you know, they're going to lose more--way more money than usual that--maybe this year and the next year, but they've built the provisions and all that sort of thing. They're going to come out fine unless they have to issue a ton more shares.
BECKY: But the back and forth in the administration right now has been which plan to follow. There's been a lot of confusion. There was this idea that the TARP money was going to be used to take the toxic assets off of their hands.
BECKY: There was the idea that maybe they should just be buying shares outright. There's the idea of nationalization out there. What's the right answer?
BUFFETT: The right answer--the right answer for me is the president to clarify things as only he can, because you have heard so many different things. And, you know, they're doing their best to communicate, but the person that the people of the United States gave their trust to not that long ago was Barack Obama. He speaks very well. He has--he is the commander in chief on this, and it has to be clarified. Like I say, the head of the New York Fed gave a talk, explained a lot of it, but nobody's going to pay that much attention to what he says. You need the president of the United States to make it very clear. Because if people aren't clear, they're going to be confused. And if they're going to be confused, they are going to be scared stiff. And that has to end.
BECKY: Does that--you make it sound almost like it doesn't matter what he says, as long as he picks one of those.
BUFFETT: Well, it matters...
BECKY: That's--you've got to--you've got to be leaning one direction.
BUFFETT: It matters somewhat. But we know that the Battle of Midway was the, you know, the important battle, you know, or that, you know, in terms of when the Philippines fell, all the--I mean, you've got to--you've got to assume that you need a commander in chief. They'll be intelligent, they've got the interests of the country at heart. And then you can't expect to agree with them on every point. And if you don't, you still get behind the effort.
JOE: Hey, Warren, you're talking about some of the investments maybe you regret. This wasn't made last year, but your what was it, a sale of puts, a long-term bet on the S&P that I think you have to mark at least a little bit to market once in a while, and it's up in the billions now. Do you regret that? Is that going to work out in the future? How long do you have now, where does the S&P have to end up?
BUFFETT: Well, the S&P has to end up 15 or 20 years from the time we did the deals at the price at which we did them. Although, if the S&P actually ends up, you know, 15 percent below or so, we still break even and we've had the use of the money for 15 or 20 years. So we're holding about $4.8 billion. The first one comes due in the latter part of 2019. And obviously I would rather put those positions on now than having put them on a few years ago. But if you--if you gave me the choice of not having the positions at all, and not being able to put them on or sticking with the positions we have, I would stick with the positions we have. I think--I think we will--the odds are good we will make money. And the thing I know for sure is we'll hold almost $5 billion for between 15 and 20 years in conjunction with it.
JOE: Hm.
BUFFETT: So I like...
JOE: Those are derivatives. You don't like derivatives, but you used them in that case, right?
BUFFETT: I--well, we've used derivatives for many, many years. I don't think derivatives are evil, per se, I think they are dangerous. I've always said they're dangerous. I said they were financial weapons of mass destruction. But uranium is dangerous, and I just went through a nuclear electric plant about two weeks ago. Cars are dangerous.
JOE: Yeah.
BUFFETT: But I mean, every American wants to have one. You know, the--a lot of things can be dangerous, but generally we regulate how they're used. I mean, there was a--there was some guard up there with a machine gun on me, you know, when I was at the nuclear plant the other day. So we use lots of things daily that are dangerous, but we generally pay some attention to how they're used.
JOE: Hm.
BUFFETT: We tell the cars how fast they can go.
JOE: Yeah, yeah. Good. Well...
BECKY: David--go ahead, Joe.
JOE: Well, hopefully, Beck, we'll have a chance to talk about, you know, AIG and what we need to do...
BECKY: Mm-hmm.
JOE: ...because to be able to, you know, to write that many insurance contracts, Warren, and not put up any collateral, that's got to be something that regulators at this point, right? I mean, that is--that's why we're in this mess right now.
BUFFETT: I wrote--I wrote Congressman Dingell in 1981 about it, when they--you know, these are--they are dangerous.
BECKY: About AIG, or about derivatives in general?
BUFFETT: Oh, they were--it was--well, it was actually about trading the S&P 500 and what--the dangers you get into when you allow people to leverage up like crazy, which derivatives allow you to do. We put margin requirements in in the United States after 1929. We said that '29 was a terrible crash, it was partly brought on by the stock market and that was partly brought on by the fact that people were buying stocks with very little down payments. So the United States Congress said to the Fed, `You regulate this thing.' That's been 75 years ago. They still regulate it, but derivatives enable people entirely to get around margin regulations. They made them meaningless. And so we leveraged up the system and we are now feeling the pain and the spread out of the pain to people who had nothing to do with it from the deleveraging the system. And it's massive. So we do need--we need something new.
BECKY: Part of the reason AIG was able to do that was because its high credit rating at that point.
BUFFETT: Absolutely. Yeah.
BECKY: You're not suggesting necessarily they change the rules on how much people have to put down based on their credit ratings, right? Because you benefit from your AAA credit rating.
BUFFETT: Yeah. Although we benefit less these days than before. But AIG had this AIG financial products. I--when I bought Gen Re, they had something called GenRe financial products.
BECKY: Right.
BUFFETT: They had 23,800 contracts. Hell, I, you know, I couldn't understand 22,000 of them, probably. I spent--and I know I couldn't get my mind around it. You--that--and people recorded profit every--you know, that section made a profit every year, supposedly, and the guy that ran it made a lot of money and everything. You know, it probably would have busted the company if they--if they'd kept it around. Anything where you use the credit of a great institution to go out and start doing all kinds of things that--enormous leverage gets you in trouble. Citigroup could do SIVs because everybody trusted Citigroup, you know, and nobody knew that, you know, all this stuff was off balance sheet. It was a way of getting around capital requirements. You have to watch people that had all big sums of money. ....................... (Contd)

Chronological order